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Abstract
We tested the magnitude of the face identity aftereffect following 
adaptation to different modes of adaptors in four experiments.  The 
perceptual  midpoint  between  two  morphed  famous  faces  was 
measured  pre-  and  post-adaptation.  Significant  aftereffects  were 
observed  for  visual  (faces)  and  non-visual  adaptors  (voices  and 
names)  but  not  non-specific  semantic  information  (e.g., 
occupations). Aftereffects were also observed following imagination 
and adaptation to an associated person. The strongest aftereffects 
were  found  adapting  to  facial  caricatures.  These  results  are 
discussed in terms of cross-modal adaptation occurring at various 
loci within the face-recognition system analogous to priming.
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1. Introduction
While one’s perception of faces is relatively robust, in that one can 
identify a familiar face under a large variety of viewing conditions, it 
has been demonstrated that prolonged exposure to distorted faces 
leads to a strong and systematic aftereffect in the direction opposite 
to the adaptor face (e.g.,  Fox and Barton,  2007; Hurlbert,  2001): 
adaptation to an expanded face will  make a subsequent average 
face appear contracted (Webster and MacLin, 1999). This is known 
as the Face Distortion Aftereffect (FDAE;  Rhodes, Jeffery, Watson, 
Clifford,  and  Nakayama,  2003;  Rhodes  and  Jeffery,  2006). 
Additionally,  adaptation  to  a  particular  face  identity  causes  an 
average face to take on aspects of the “opposite” identity (Leopold, 
O’Toole,  Vetter,  and Blanz (2001).  The present article focuses on 
this  second  type  of  adaptation,  known  as  the  Face  Identity 
Aftereffect  (FIAE). Similarities  are drawn between adaptation  and 
priming  processes,  although priming  has  been found to  occur  in 
many  more  situations  than  have  been  tested  in  the  adaptation 
literature.  The remainder of the paper concerns four experiments 
that  explore  adaptation  under  a  range  of  conditions  for  which 
priming effects have been found. 
1.1. Adaptation
Adaptation is the process where perceptual experience is affected 
by  constant  stimulation  of  a  particular  characteristic  creating  an 
aftereffect distinctly different from previous exposure (e.g., Sekuler 
and Blake, 2001). For example, adaptation to specific spatial frequencies 
causes  them to be more difficult   to  detect  post  adaptation (Menees,  1988). 
Such a  low­level  adaptation appears  quite  similar   to  high­level  adaptation 
involving faces.  Leopold et al. (2001) conducted a pioneering study 
into  FIAEs.  In  their  study,  200  faces  were  morphed  together  to 
produce a single average face. This was assumed to be the centre of 
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the face-space (see Valentine, 1991). Due to the morphing process, 
each face identity could then be measured in terms of Euclidean 
distances from the average face. Some of the faces were selected to 
be used as targets and a series of morph faces were constructed 
that ranged from the average face to each target face identity, each 
differing in identity ‘strength’. Identification thresholds (the required 
identity strength to perceive the face identity) were taken before 
and after adaptation to an anti-face identity (opposite from the face-
identity in terms of the Euclidean geometry). Post adaptation to an 
anti-face (e.g., anti-Adam), the identification threshold for the face 
(e.g., Adam) was lowered by an average of 12.5% suggesting it was 
easier  to  perceive  the  identity  following  adaptation  to  the  anti-
identity.
The magnitude of the FIAE is typically measured in terms of 
difference in identification thresholds pre- and post-adaptation and 
is dependent on the presentation duration of both the adaptor and 
the  test  stimuli  (Leopold,  Rhodes,  Müller,  and  Jeffery,  2005). 
Stronger  FIAEs  are  observed  when  the  adaptor  is  presented  for 
longer  durations  (16000  ms)  than  shorter  durations  (1000  ms). 
Moreover, FIAEs are significantly stronger when the test stimuli are 
presented  for  shorter  durations  (100  ms)  than  longer  durations 
(1600  ms). Face  aftereffects  are  partially  size-tolerant  since  the 
FDAE  transfers  from  an  adaptor  of  one  size  to  test  stimuli  of 
different sizes (Zhao and Chubb, 2001) and also across parts of the 
retina (Anderson and Wilson, 2005). Jiang, Blanz, and O’Toole (2006) 
demonstrated that the FIAE transfers across a substantial change in 
viewpoint (300 rotation) indicating the mechanisms for the FIAE are 
of  a  higher-level  nature  (see  also,  Pourtois,  Schwartz,  Seghier, 
Lazeyras,  & Vuilleumier,  2005,  but  see Jeffery,  Rhodes,  & Busey, 
2006, for a different result described further below).
Face  aftereffects  are  more  robust  for  familiar  faces  than 
unfamiliar faces (Carbon & Leder, 2005;  Jiang, Blanz, and O’Toole, 
2007). Jiang et al. (2007) specifically tested the degree of familiarity 
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that participants’ have with a face and the magnitude of the FIAE in 
within-  and  between-viewpoint  adaptation.  They  trained  90 
participants on a set of 16 faces to varying degrees of familiarity. In 
the low-familiarity condition, the participants only saw the face in a 
frontal  view  twice.  In  the  high-familiarity  conditions,  participants 
saw the faces eight times each in frontal views only, rotated views 
only  or  half  frontal  and  half  rotated  views.  An  extreme  familiar 
condition  was also  included where  participants  saw the faces  16 
times in frontal  views and 16 times in rotated views. This  highly 
controlled  study  demonstrated  that,  although  the  magnitude  of 
adaptation was greater for within-viewpoint adaptation, there was 
still  significant  adaptation  for  between-viewpoint  adaptation. 
Moreover,  the  largest  FIAEs  were  observed for  the  most  familiar 
faces.  Indeed,  the  difference  between  the  FIAE  to  same-  and 
different-viewpoint  adaptation  was  smallest  for  the  extremely 
familiar condition. This suggests that familiar and unfamiliar faces 
are represented differently  (c.f.,  Megreya & Burton,  2006;  Ryu & 
Chaudhuri,  2006, consistent with neuroimaging evidence by Eger, 
Schweinberger,  Dolan,  &  Henson,  2005)  and  that  adaptation  to 
familiar faces is based on a three-dimensional representation of a 
face,  whereas adaptation  to  an unfamiliar  face  is  based on two-
dimensional image qualities.
In a review of how FDAEs in unfamiliar faces are affected by 
image adjustments from adaptation to test, Yamashita, Hardy, De 
Valois, and Webster (2005), noted that the magnitude of adaptation 
was dependent on visual similarities between the adaptor and the 
test stimuli. The more similar the adaptor was to the test stimuli the 
greater  the  magnitude  of  the  aftereffect.  In  addition  there  were 
classes of  image adjustments that affected the magnitude of the 
aftereffects  more  than  others.  Specifically,  size  and  colour 
differences  between the  adaptor  and the test  stimuli  reduce the 
magnitude  of  adaptation  significantly  less  than  spatial  frequency 
and contrast differences between the adaptor and test stimuli.
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According  to  Moradi,  Koch,  and  Shimojo  (2005),  the  FIAE 
requires conscious perception, since it is significantly reduced if the 
adapting face is not consciously visible to participants. Moradi et al. 
tested  the  effect  different  types  of  suppression  had  on  the 
magnitude  of  the  FIAE.  Though  the  FIAE  transferred  from  the 
adapted  retina  to  the  unadapted  retina,  it  disappears  when  the 
participants  are  attending  to  the  eye  that  is  not  adapted.  For 
example,  one eye is  being adapted to  a  face identity,  while  the 
other  eye  is  presented  with  a  pattern  of  moving  random  dots. 
Participants who attended to the moving pattern often ignored the 
face and failed to show the FIAE.
Moradi  et  al.  (2005)  also  tested  whether  imagination  can 
cause the FIAE. Six  participants were trained to associate names 
with the anti-faces of Leopold et al. (2001). This training lasted 300 
trials. They were then asked to imagine one of the faces and were 
asked how clear their mental image was. Participants reported that 
their  visualisation  was  vivid  and yet  demonstrated  no FIAE  even 
after prolonged visual imagery. This observation is surprising given 
that there is activation in the visual cortex during mental imagery 
(e.g., Kosslyn et al., 1993; Slotnick, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2005). In 
addition,  the  fusiform  gyrus  (the  face  specific  area  of  the 
inferotemporal  cortex,  Kanwisher,  McDermott,  and Chun, 1997) is 
active  during  perception  and  mental  imagery  of  faces  (Kreiman, 
Koch, and Fried,  2000;  O’Craven and Kanwisher,  2000)  and even 
without awareness of presented faces (Marois, Yi, and Chun, 2004; 
Moutoussis  and  Zeki,  2002).  Additionally,  the  FIAE  activates  the 
fusiform gyrus (Loffler, Yourganov, Wilkinson, & Wilson, 2005). Since 
there is significant individual differences in the ability to mentally 
visualise  (e.g.,  Amedi,  Malach,  &  Pascual-Leone,  2005;  Bywaters, 
Andrade, & Turpin, 2004;  Hasnain & Husain, 1980;  Issac & Marks, 
1994;  Richardson, 2000; Richardson & McAndrew, 1990; Zarrinpar, 
Deldin, & Kosslyn, 2006) and  in the activation of the visual cortex 
during imagery (c.f., Cui, Jeter, Yang, Montague, & Eagleman, 2007; 
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Ishai,  Schmidt,  &  Boesiger,  2005),  it  is  possible  that  the  small 
sample (6 participants) tested by Moradi et al. was affected by a 
single participant  unable to accurately visualise a particular  face. 
Additionally, training participants to associate a name with a two-
dimensional digitised face that has only ever been seen in one pose 
is unlikely to lead to an accurate face representation (c.f., Burton, 
Jenkins,  Hancock,  &  White,  2005).  Moreover,  the  assessment  of 
visualisation clarity was not based on previous mental imagery work 
(e.g., Marks, 1973; McKelvie, 1994). Indeed, Hills, Elward, and Lewis 
(2009)  have  shown  that  the  FIAE  can  be  caused  by  imagined 
adaptation and even to name stimuli.
Hills  et  al.  adapted  participants  to  an  image  of  a  famous 
person.  Subsequently,  they presented  a  morph  between the  two 
identities,  and asked participants to state who the morph looked 
like.  Each  participant  participated  in  a  single  trial.  Their  results 
indicated  that  an  image  adapted  90% of  participants  whereas  a 
name stimulus adapted 75% of participants. Hills et al. also included 
a condition in which participants were told to imagine a particular 
identity. This condition produced greater magnitude of adaptation 
than the name stimulus, but only in participants who were better 
able to mentally visualise.
To summarise the work on adaptation within face recognition: 
largest aftereffects are noted for adaptors that are most similar to 
the test stimuli; smaller, but still significant, aftereffects are noted 
for adaptors that are in a different pose than the test stimuli; and 
adaptation  may  or  may  not  require  presentation  of  the  actual 
stimulus. Given the potential for cross-modal adaptation implied by 
Hills et al. (2009), in this work, we extrapolated the stimuli that may 
cause  adaptation  based  on  parallels  with  priming.  In  the  next 
section, priming will be discussed and those parallels will be drawn.
1.2. Priming
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Priming  is  defined  as  a  change  in  the  processing  of  a  stimulus 
caused by prior exposure to the same or a related stimulus (Gabrili, 
1998). Broadly speaking there are two forms of priming: perceptual 
(repetition)  and  conceptual  (semantic:  Roediger  &  McDermott, 
1993; Tulving & Schacter, 1990). Perceptual priming results in an 
enhanced ability  to  identify  or  recall  a  stimulus  (Graf,  Squire,  & 
Mandler, 1984) and its effectiveness depends on the similarity of the 
prime to the subsequent stimulus, where greater similarity results in 
greater priming (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Conceptual priming results 
in  facilitated  processing  of  the  meaning  of  a  stimulus  (Meyer  & 
Schvanevedlt,  1971). The prime can be subliminal or supraliminal 
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980) and depends less on the perceptual similarity 
between the prime and the target than perceptual priming. Within 
the  face  recognition  literature  there  have  been  many  studies 
published exploring perceptual and conceptual priming.
A. Ellis, Young, Flude, and Hay (1987) reported three studies 
where participants were instructed to state whether or not a face 
was familiar. When participants had seen a photograph of a familiar 
face in a preceding stage of  the experiment they were faster  at 
identifying that the face was familiar by 71 ms than if they had not 
seen  the  face  in  the  experimental  session  (Experiment  1). 
Furthermore, familiarity judgements were not made quicker if the 
participant  had  seen  the  face’s  written  name  prior  to  the  face 
(Experiment  2).  Experiment  3  compared  the  speed  of  familiarity 
judgements when the prime photograph was identical to, similar to 
(same viewing angle of the same person), or dissimilar to (different 
viewing angle  of  the same person)  the target  photograph.  If  the 
prime photograph was the same as that used as the target,  the 
familiarity judgement was made more quickly by 196 ms, compared 
to 163 ms faster if the photograph was only similar. Reaction times 
were  reduced  by 104 ms when a  dissimilar  photograph  was  the 
prime. These results indicate the importance of perceptual similarity 
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in  the  repetition  priming  effect  (see  also  Ellis,  D.  Ellis,  &  Hosie, 
1993).
These results  are slightly  different  from those subsequently 
found by Young, Flude, Hellawell, and A. Ellis (1994), where written 
names  sped  up  familiarity  judgements  of  faces  if  the  prime 
preceded the face by a short period of time. Moreover, Ellis, Jones, 
and Mosdell (1997) found that voices can prime faces. However, this 
cross-modal  repetition  priming  effect  only  occurs  if  the  prime 
precedes the target face by a maximum of five seconds. Johnston 
and Barry (2006) have shown that cross-modal repetition priming 
effects are significantly smaller than within-modal priming effects, 
but are still significant themselves.
In  addition  to  perceptual  (repetition)  priming,  Bruce  and 
Valentine (1986) found that there are also associative (semantic) 
priming effects, where the face or name of a person will speed up 
the  identification  of  a  name  or  face  of  a  related  person.   For 
example,  presentation  of  the  face  of  Ronnie  Barker  sped  up 
familiarity judgements made to Ronnie Corbett’s face – since they 
are a comedy duo and often seen together.  Furthermore,  Young, 
Hellawell, and de Haan (1988) have shown an associative form of 
cross-modal priming, where the name of a famous person speeds up 
recognition  of  a  highly  associated  famous  face.  For  example, 
reading the name of “Stan Laurel” will speed up the recognition of 
the face of “Stan Laurel” and the recognition of the face of “Oliver 
Hardy”. Semantic priming has also been shown by Burton, Kelly, and 
Bruce  (1998)  who showed that  subsequent  semantic  judgements 
made about a face are faster following initial semantic judgements 
being made. These subsequent semantic judgements could be of 
the same or different kind (i.e., nationality and alive/dead).
Another form of semantic priming is that of category priming. 
Category priming (Carson and Burton, 2001) is where priming of the 
category label speeds up recognition of all known exemplars of that 
category. For example, the category label “comedians” will  speed 
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up  recognition  of  “Stan  Laurel”  and  all  other  known  comedians. 
Category priming is a weaker variant of semantic priming. Possibly a 
related effect is that of stereotype priming, in which unfamiliar faces 
that  resemble  the  prototype  of  a  particular  occupation  are 
recognised more accurately if they are encoded with the relevant 
stereotype presented as a word (Hills, Lewis, & Honey, 2008).
The face priming studies reported here are similar in kind to 
the general priming studies (such as word priming). Priming effects 
are larger if the modality of the prime and the target stimulus is the 
same. Nevertheless, priming effects are observed if the prime and 
target stimulus differ in modality. Repetition and semantic priming 
are clearly observable within the face processing system.  
1.3. The loci of priming and adaptation within the Interactive 
Activation and Competition model
The Interactive Activation and Competition (IAC) model contains a 
number  of  pools  that  represent  the different  aspects  of  the face 
recognition system. At the lowest level is the visual input. Though 
generally  underspecified,  the  perception  and  coding  of  a  face  is 
done  here.  Burton  et  al.  (1999)  have  used  principal  component 
analysis to model this front-end. This principal component analysis 
front-end may be represented by Valentine’s face-space (Hancock, 
Burton,  &  Bruce,  1996;  Turk  &  Pentland,  1991;  Valentin,  Abdi, 
Edelman, & O’Toole, 1997). Following the visual input level is the 
face recognition pool, where nodes representing all the faces within 
memory are stored. There is a Face Recognition Unit (FRU) for every 
face that is stored within memory, and each is purely visual. It may 
be an average for all the many views of a particular person, or it 
may contain all possible views encountered of that person.  Burton 
et  al.  (1990)  suggest  that  the  FRUs  store  the  visual  structural 
descriptions  of  faces which allow views of  one known face to be 
distinguished from views of other faces, known or otherwise. Some 
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researchers have indicated that the FRU pool is best represented by 
the  face-space  (e.g.,  Valentine,  Chiroro,  and  Dixon,  1995). 
Connected to each FRU,  through Person Identity  Nodes (PINs),  is 
person-specific information in terms of many Semantic Information 
Units  (SIUs).  These  nodes  provide  all  the  semantic  information 
concerning  that  identity.  Each  aspect  represents  a  different 
characteristic  of  someone’s  identity  connected to  the  visual  face 
store. A basic architecture is shown in Figure 1.
__________________
Figure 1 about here
__________________
The  priming  effects  described in  the  previous  section  have 
been  succinctly  explained  within  the  interactive  activation  and 
competition  model  (IAC)  of  face  recognition  (Burton,  Bruce  and 
Johnston, 1990) or the model of Farah, O’Reilly, and Vecera (FOV, 
1993).  The IAC model  is  based upon neural  network architecture 
(c.f., Grossberg, 1978; McClelland, 1981) and comprises processing 
units  organised  into  hierarchically  arranged  pools.  Each  unit  is 
connected to other units within the same pool  by inhibitory links 
which  are all  of  equal  strength  (Burton & Bruce,  1993),  but  less 
strong than excitatory links between units that cross pools (Burton, 
Bruce,  &  Hancock,  1999).  Each unit  takes  on  an activation  level 
between fixed maximum and minimum values which are updated 
with  each  processing  cycle.  The  model  is  stabilised  by  a  global 
decay function which drives all units to a resting level of activation. 
All the links are bi-directional (Burton et al, 1990). Activation of units 
can be external  or  internal.  External  input  is  through  processing 
something  in  the  real  world,  whereas  internal  input  is  activation 
spreading from other units. The activation level of a particular unit is 
proportional  to  the  product  of  the  strength  of  activation  of  the 
connected  units  and  the  connection  strengths.  The  ease  of 
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recognition is based upon the number of processing cycles required 
to reach the threshold value (Burton et al., 1990).
Priming occurs when the activation level of one node raises 
the activation level of a connected node above the threshold level. 
External activation activates a node and through internal activation, 
all nodes connected through excitatory links become active. Thus, 
the internal activation can be cross-modal. From this analysis it is 
clear  how  the  priming  effects  explained  in  Section  1.2  can  be 
explained within the IAC framework.
When presented with a visual input, the visual nodes become 
active  and  their  activation  threshold  is  lowered  until  the  global 
decay function brings the system back to a stable resting level. If 
the same visual input is presented before the global decay function 
brings the system back to the resting level, then less external input 
is required for the same output from that node. Thus, within-modal 
repetition priming (and specifically where the prime is identical to 
the target stimulus) can be explained in the perceptual front-end of 
the IAC model.
The situation is slightly different if the prime image does not 
match the test  image exactly  (i.e.,  pose  change).  Simple  image-
based priming is not sufficient to explain this. Instead, the priming is 
occurring  at  the  FRU  level  as  the  FRUs  contain  3-dimensional, 
viewpoint  independent representations  of  the face (Burton et al., 
1990). It must be accepted that priming involving identical primes 
and targets may involve the FRU, but this is not required since it 
may not differ from object priming. In other words, when there is no 
change in image from prime to test, the mechanisms do not need to 
be face-specific.
To explain cross-modal  repetition,  semantic  and associative 
priming, the level of explanation must be higher, at the PIN level. 
Here,  activation  of  a  name  (NRU),  voice  (VRU),  or  semantic 
information  (SIUs)  causes  activation  in  the  PIN  and  this  causes 
activation  in  the  FRU.  Cross-modal  priming  thus  involves  extra 
12
levels. Due to this additional processing level and the limitation of 
spreading activation by the IAC framework (inhibitory links within 
pools  and  the  global  decay  function)  these  priming  effects  are 
usually weaker than within-modal priming effects.
Whereas priming usually  improves subsequent  identification 
and recognition, adaptation usually produces the opposite effects: 
identification and recognition is less likely following adaptation. In 
the face recognition research summarised in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, 
priming  of  faces  speeds  up  identification  of  faces  whereas 
adaptation  causes  identification  to  be  less  likely  in  a  morph. 
Similarities between the two can be drawn given the observation 
that both priming effects and aftereffects depend on the perceptual 
similarity between the prime or adaptor and the test stimulus (A. 
Ellis et al., 1987; Jiang et al., 2006). Although this similarity exists, 
priming appears to cause an effect opposite to adaptation. There 
are  two  potential  factors  that  may  explain  this:  differences  in 
presentation time; and the interval between adaptor/prime and the 
test stimuli. Priming usually has short presentation time (less than 
1s),  whereas  adaptation  has  longer  presentation  times  (see e.g., 
Leopold  et  al.,  2005).  In  terms  of  the  interval  between  the 
adaptor/prime  and  test  stimuli,  it  is  usually  considered  that  the 
adaptor must be presented immediately before the test (Leopold et 
al., 2005), whereas certain forms of priming can be longer lasting 
(see e.g., Young et al., 1988).
Having  explained  priming  within  the  IAC  and  described 
similarities in the within-modal perceptual priming and adaptation, it 
seems sensible to employ the IAC to explain adaptation. The locus 
of  explanation  for  adaptation  and  priming  may  be  parallel. 
Viewpoint dependent adaptation only requires the front-end of the 
IAC  and  thus  is  unlikely  to  be  face-specific  (Jiang  et  al.,  2006). 
Viewpoint  independent  adaptation  requires  a  3-dimensional 
representation of  the face and thus the locus for  this  is  the FRU 
pool. Since this is a one level abstraction from the actual perception 
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then it would be predicted by the IAC and is observed that viewpoint 
independent adaptation is of a smaller magnitude than viewpoint 
dependent  adaptation  (Jeffery  et  al.,  2006;  Jiang  et  al.,  2006). 
Broadly  speaking,  the  number  of  pools  the  prime  or  adaptation 
passes through the smaller the effect.
The  above  explanation  of  within-modal  perceptual  priming 
and adaptation in terms of the perceptual front-end and the FRU 
pool of the IAC suggests that the IAC can be used to suggest how 
cross-modal adaptation may take place. Given that the IAC explains 
cross-modal priming, it is conceivable that the same analysis could 
be applied to predict cross-modal adaptation. The priming parallel of 
adaptation  allows  clear  predictions  as  to  the  magnitude  of 
aftereffects due to different classes of adaptors. If we consider that, 
like priming, adaptation can occur in every pool of the IAC then we 
might expect adaptation to occur in the NRU, VRU, SIU, PIN, and the 
FRU pools. Aftereffects observed in face perception could thus be 
caused  by  adaptation  to  the  NRU  through  the  PIN.  In  fact, 
adaptation to any stimulus that could be used to uniquely recognise 
an individual would lead to aftereffects of that FRU. Hence cross-
modal adaptation is predicted such that adaptation to a name or a 
voice would lead to reduced recognition threshold for faces of that 
person.  
Though the IAC model can be used to predict what classes of 
stimuli will cause aftereffects and to what degree of magnitude, the 
current mechanisms does not explicitly allow for adaptation (Bruce, 
personal communication). That is, though we have drawn parallels 
between priming and adaptation in terms of the classes of stimuli 
that  may  cause  them  based  on  the  IAC  model,  there  is  no 
mechanism within the IAC model that allows for adaptation. It may 
be  that  the  mechanisms  for  adaptation  are  not  based  on  face-
specific mechanisms (Jiang et al., 2006) and will not include person 
specific  information.  In  other  words,  it  may  be  that  cross-modal 
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adaptation  is  not  possible.  If  cross-modal  adaptation  does  occur, 
however, then it is important to explore how this may occur.
One mechanism that seems plausible is that the presentation 
of  a  name causes  the  face  to  be  imagined.  While  Moradi  et  al. 
(2005)  found  that  imagination  does  not  cause  aftereffects,  this 
explanation cannot be ruled out for reasons expressed earlier and 
the results of Hills et al. (2009). Thus, prolonged presentation of a 
name  causes  prolonged  imagination  of  a  face  and  this  causes 
adaptation  in  the  FRU.  Additionally,  there  is  evidence  that  face 
memory  is  not  veridical  (Harvey,  1986).  Instead,  memory  may 
distort  faces  and  emphasize  more  distinctive  features  (Rhodes, 
Brennan,  &  Carey,  1987).  Thus,  if  there  is  some memory  based 
component in adaptation to faces then non-veridical images of faces 
could cause adaptation. One method for assessing this is the use of 
caricatures.
Caricatures of faces are often recognised and identified faster 
and more accurately than veridical faces (Mauro & Kubovy, 1992; 
Rhodes, Byatt, Tremewan, & Kennedy, 1997). Rhodes et al. (1987) 
found that using line-drawing caricatures a recognition advantage 
for  16%  caricatures  was  found.  Using  photographic  caricatures, 
Benson  &  Perrett  (1991a,  b)  calculated  that  the  caricature 
advantage was observed for caricatures distorted by 4.4%, based on 
the average performance on caricatures around this value (i.e., 3% 
caricature produced a smaller recognition advantage than 4%, but 
greater than 6%). Rhodes (1993) found the caricature advantage to 
be 5.5% caricature. These results indicate that memory may distort 
faces by between 4.4% and 16% in the direction  away from the 
average. Thus, cross-modally driven FIAEs based on memory and 
imagination will be larger following adaptation to a caricature than 
to a veridical image.
In this section, we have suggested that perceptual priming is 
analogous to adaptation in faces in terms of how the magnitude of 
the effects depends on the perceptual similarity between the prime 
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or adaptor and test. This analogy was taken further using the IAC 
model of face perception and it was hypothesised that cross-modal 
adaptation could occur and this could be based on imagery of non-
veridical face memory.
1.4. The Present work
We have described how priming and adaptation may be analogous 
in  terms  of  the  classes  of  stimuli  that  can  cause  them and  the 
difference in magnitude of the effects these classes will have. The 
present  work aimed to explore,  using parallels  to priming,  cross-
modal adaptation. We tested whether cross-modal adaptation could 
cause  FIAEs  and  whether  they  are  similar  in  their  form  to  the 
priming effects in terms of the types of stimuli that will cause them. 
Thus,  faces,  names, voices, semantic information,  and associated 
people  were  used  to  adapt  the  perception  of  a  target  face. 
Additionally, we tested whether this was based upon non-veridical 
memory  and  imagery  by  using  imagination  and  caricatures  as 
adaptors
Two faces morphed together are characterised by categorical 
perception  between  the  two  (Beale  and  Keil,  1995;  Rotshtein, 
Henson, Treves, Driver, and Dolan, 2005). The perceptual midpoint 
between the two is where participants perceive the amount of each 
identity in the morph is the same (the perceived stimulus equality 
point,  PSE).  The change in  this  point  pre-  and post-adaptation  is 
used as the measure of the magnitude of adaptation. The PSE is 
equivalent  to  the  identity  threshold  of  a  particular  facial  identity 
when in a morph continuum of two identities (c.f.,  Leopold et al., 
2001).  Thus,  a  higher  identity  threshold  following  adaptation  is 
evidence  of  adaptation.  Psychometric  functions  were  fitted  to 
calculate the PSE.
Familiar (famous) faces are used in the present Experiments 
since  they  have  established  semantic,  visual  and  often  auditory 
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information associated with them. This is a slight deviation from the 
methodology of Leopold et al. (2001), however, it was felt that this 
was  easier  to  test  cross-modal  adaptation,  given  that  training 
participants to associate names, voices, and semantic information is 
dissimilar to everyday face recognition.
This  paper  presents  four  experiments  that  test  adaptation 
using the priming analogy. The four experiments represent different 
classes of priming that have been defined within the face perception 
literature:  Experiment  1  assessed repetition  adaptation  (involving 
multimodal identity specific information, such as names and voices); 
Experiment  2  assessed  category  and  semantic  adaptation; 
Experiment  3  assessed associative adaptation;  and Experiment  4 
assessed whether aftereffects are memory based using imagination 
and caricatures.
2. Experiment 1: Repetition Adaptation
From  the  priming  analogy,  FIAEs  may  be  observable  following 
adaptation to several modes of identity-specific information. Within-
modal repetition priming is stronger when the same image is used 
as the prime and that used at test than when a different image of 
the  same  face  is  used  as  the  prime  to  that  used  at  test. 
Analogously, it would be expected that the magnitude of observed 
aftereffects  will  be significantly  greater  when the  same image is 
used as the adaptor and as that used to construct the test morphs 
than when a different image of the same face is used as the adaptor 
to that used to construct the test morphs. Cross-modal repetition 
priming  can be caused by non-visual  stimuli  such as  names and 
voices and this produces significantly smaller priming effects than 
priming due to images. Using this parallel, it may be expected that 
cross-modal  adaptation  is  possible.  Specifically,  adaptation  to 
names  and  voices  may  occur.  Such  adaptation  may  cause 
aftereffects in the perception of faces. The magnitude of adaptation 
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due to names and voices should be smaller than adaptation due to 
images, based on the observations in priming. Experiment 1 aims to 
explore the possibility of this cross-modal adaptation analogous to 
priming in terms of the stimuli that cause it.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Participants  were  48  psychology  undergraduate  students  who 
undertook  this  experiment  as  partial  fulfilment  of  a  course 
requirement.  All  participants  had  normal  or  corrected  vision  and 
were Caucasian British nationals who were familiar with the target 
identities.  Participants  were  randomly  divided  into  one  of  the 
conditions  with  the  pre-requisite  that  an  equal  number  of 
participants participated in each condition (N = 12).
2.1.2. Materials
 Adaptor – Same image
Images of four famous faces were collected from the Internet. These 
were George Bush, Tony Blair, Harrison Ford, and Pierce Brosnan. All 
images were matched for pose (frontal), lighting (lit  from above), 
dimensions (100 mm by 160 mm), resolution (72 dpi). The images 
were  cropped  to  remove  the  background  of  the  image  and  any 
clothing.
Adaptor – Different image
Different  images of  the same four famous people as above were 
collected  from the Internet.  These images  were  not  matched for 
pose or lighting but were matched for dimensions (100 mm by 160 
mm) and resolution (72 dpi). These images were in ¾ poses with 
lighting  from one side.  The images were cropped to  remove the 
background and any clothing.
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Adaptor – Voice
For the voice stimuli, sound clips were collected from Internet of the 
four identities described above. They were of speeches or interviews 
and  recorded  in  2005.  The  clips  were  cut  down  to  1  minute  in 
length, chosen to be the second to third minute of the recording. 
This  meant that the clip came in mid sentence, and cut out mid 
sentence. These clips contained no interruption from the audience 
or interviewer. Two further five second clips were made from the 
next minute of the clips in the same manner. Voices were played 
into  the  laboratory  using  headphone  speakers  at  a  comfortable 
volume.
Adaptor – Names
Names of the four identites were displayed on screen in Palatino 
Font, size 20, black on white.
Morph Continua
To measure identity thresholds, morph continua from one identity to 
a second identity were constructed using SmartmorphTM Software, 
using  186  key  anchor  points  (c.f.,  Brennan,  1985).  The  morph 
continua  ranged from 100% Identity  1  to  100% Identity  2  in  50 
equal  increments  of  2%  identity  strength.  The  images  used  to 
construct the morphs were those described in the “Adaptor– same 
image” section above. Morph continua were made between all four 
identities described above, creating six continua.
General Apparatus
All  stimuli  were  presented  from  a  Toshiba  Tecra  M4  Tablet  PC 
running SuperlabPro 2 Research SoftwareTM onto a high resolution 
colour monitor (refresh rate 60 Hz). 
2.1.3. Design
The type of adaptor was manipulated between-subjects, creating a 
four level univariate design. These were: same image as that used 
to  construct  the  test  morphs  (hereafter  same  image);  different 
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image to that used to construct the test morphs (hereafter different 
image); name; and voice. There were six test morph continua, with 
two  identities  making  up  each  continuum.  Participants  were 
randomly allocated to tested in one of the continua such that the 
same number of participants were tested on each continuum (N = 2, 
in each of the adaptor conditions). Thus, participants were tested on 
one  pair  only.  Participants  were  then  randomly  allocated  to  be 
adapted to one end of continuum such that both ends were used as 
the adaptor identity. The order of presentation of the morphs during 
the baseline and the test phases of the experiment was randomised. 
Each participant saw a morphed continuum made up of only two 
identities  and  was  adapted  to  one  adaptor.  In  no  condition  or 
Experiment  was  there  a  significant  effect  of  identity  on  the 
magnitude of the FIAE, thus the data has been collapsed across this 
variable in all Experiments.
2.1.4. Procedure
Participants were brought to a darkened laboratory individually and 
sat  50 cm from the computer screen.  The Experiment had three 
consecutive  phases:  baseline,  adaptation,  and  test.  The  baseline 
phase  involved  the  participants  seeing  all  50  morphs  in  the 
particular morph continuum they had been allocated to 10 times 
each in a random order. Thus, they received 500 trials.  For each 
trial, the participants had to decide whether the morph looked more 
like Identity 1 or Identity 2 of the continuum they had allocated to, 
by  pressing  the  appropriate  key1.  This  method  is  based  on  the 
procedures  discussed  in  Levitt  (1971).  Thus,  the  design 
implemented  was  a  two-alternative  forced-choice  psychometric 
paradigm. Each trial was response terminated. Between each trial a 
100 ms white noise mask was on screen.
1 The response keys were: G for George Bush; T for Tony Blair; H for Harrison Ford; P for Pierce 
Brosnan. Each participant only had two identities to choose from.
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Once the baseline phase had finished, the participants were 
instructed to rest for two minutes. Following their rest, participants 
were presented with the adaptor and told to “examine the image 
that was on screen” (c.f., Rhodes et al., 2003). When the adaptor 
was a voice, the screen was blank and the sound clip was played 
through  headphone  speakers.  The adaptor  was  presented  for  60 
seconds.
Immediately following the adaptor, participants began the test 
phase.  This  was  similar  to  the  baseline  phase.  Participants  were 
presented with all 50 morphs from the relevant morph continua 10 
times  in  a  random  order.  Thus,  they  received  500  test  trials. 
Preceding  each  test  face,  participants  were  presented  with  the 
adaptor for another  five seconds (c.f., Rhodes et al., 2003). When 
the adaptor was the voice, the screen was blank for five seconds, 
and  the  voice  clip  was  played  into  the  laboratory  through 
headphone speakers. Participants were instructed to respond as in 
the  baseline  procedure.  Each  trial  was  response  terminated.  A 
representation of the procedure is shown in Figure 2.
__________________
Figure 2 about here
__________________
2.2. Results
The magnitude of the aftereffects was calculated by the required 
identity strength to perceive an identity post-adaptation subtracted 
from  the  identity  strength  to  perceive  the  same  identity  pre-
adaptation  (c.f.,  Moradi  et  al.,  2005).  The  identity  strength  is 
equated  to  the  PSE  in  a  psychometric  function  and  these  were 
calculated pre- and post-adaptation using MatLabTM, for each of the 
48 participants. Due to space limitations these are not presented. In 
all  cases,  psychometric  functions  produced  a  good  fit  with  the 
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fiducial  limits  having  a  maximum  range  of  5%.  The  differences 
between the PSE pre- and post-adaptation are summarised in Figure 
3.  There  were  more  opposite  identity  responses  post-adaptation 
than pre-adaptation.  The perceived perceptual  boundary between 
the  two  identities  was  thus  shifted  in  the  direction  toward  that 
identity which the participants had been adapted to.
___________________
Figure 3 about here
__________________
The data summarised in Figure 3 were subjected to a 4-level 
univariate ANOVA with the single factor being the type of adaptor. 
This  revealed  a  significant  effect  of  type  of  adaptor,  F(3,  44)  = 
21.672, MSE = 19.227, p < .001. Tukey HSD post hoc tests were run 
to explore this effect fully. These showed that the magnitude of FIAE 
was greater for the  same image than: the  different image (mean 
difference = 5.224, p < .05); name (mean difference = 12.317, p < .
001); and  voice (mean difference = 9.593,  p < .001). In addition, 
the magnitude of  the FIAE was greater  for  different  image than: 
name (mean  difference  =  7.093,  p <  .001);  and  voice (mean 
difference  = 4.368,  p < .05).  The difference between  name and 
voice was not significant.
One-sample t-tests were conducted on the data to discover if 
significant aftereffects were observed in each condition. Throughout 
this paper, the one-sample t-tests were compared to zero (i.e., no 
aftereffect).  These  showed  that  significant  aftereffects  were 
observed when the adaptor was the: same image, t (11) = 16.621, 
p < .001; different image, t (11) = 9.490, p < .001; name, t (11) = 
6.679,  p <  .001;  and  voice,  t  (11)  =  13.774,  p <  .001.  Thus, 
aftereffects  were observed following  adaptation  to  all  the  stimuli 
tested here.
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2.3. Discussion
Significant FIAEs were observed for all the types of adaptor tested 
here. These results indicate that FIAE can be caused by non-facial 
information (i.e., voices and names) in addition to facial information. 
The adaptation observed here crossed modalities from names and 
voices  to  faces.  Within-modal  (and  specifically  within-viewpoint) 
adaptation caused larger aftereffects than cross-modal adaptation. 
Indeed, there was not a significant difference in the magnitude of 
the FIAE caused by either of the two non-visual modalities tested 
here.  These results  parallel  those of  priming studies closely:-  the 
effects are greatest when there is greater visual similarity between 
the adaptor/prime and the test; the effects are greater for within 
modal  than cross  modal  adaptation/priming.  The mechanisms for 
this shall be discussed in more detail in the General Discussion.
3. Experiment 2: Semantic Adaptation
Experiment 1 demonstrated that adaptation to non-visual identity 
specific information can cause FIAEs. Arguably a name is a special 
type of semantic information (Young, McWeeny, Ellis, & Hay, 1986). 
Thus, it is possible that other types of semantic information may be 
able to cause adaptation to a particular identity. In terms of priming, 
semantic and category priming have been known to exist,  where 
priming of category information speeds up familiarity judgements of 
members  of  that  category  (e.g.,  “actor”  speeding  up  the 
judgements made to Tom Hanks, Carson & Burton, 2001). Here we 
test the existence of semantic/category adaptation. The same face 
identities used in Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2.  Four 
levels  of  semantic information were chosen. These were:  specific 
role  (President,  Prime  Minister,  Indiana  Jones,  and  James  Bond); 
occupation (Politicians and Actors); and nationality (American and 
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British2).  Specific  role  semantic  information  is  only  relevant  to  a 
small number of people (few people will be able to name fewer than 
2  and more than 5  other  identities  for  these roles3).  Occupation 
semantic information characteristically fits many more people than 
specific  role  information and less than nationality.  Two additional 
adaptors  were included as controls  and comparators:  face image 
and  name.  Thus,  the  magnitude  of  aftereffects  for  each  level  of 
semantic  information  can  be  compared  to  the  unique  form  of 
semantic information (name). It is predicted that the more specific 
the piece of semantic information the greater the magnitude of the 
aftereffect observed.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Participants  were  40  psychology  undergraduate  students  who 
undertook  this  experiment  as  partial  fulfilment  of  a  course 
requirement.  All  participants  had  normal  or  corrected  vision  and 
were Caucasian British nationals who were familiar with the target 
identities.  Participants  were  randomly  divided  into  one  of  the 
conditions  with  the  pre-requisite  that  an  equal  number  of 
participants participated in  each condition (N = 8 in  each of  the 
adaptor conditions). 
3.1.2. Materials
Morph stimuli were collected and constructed as in Experiment 1. 
The  same  image  adaptors  used  in  Experiment  1  were  used  in 
Experiment 2. All the semantic information stimuli were displayed 
2 Although Pierce Brosnan is Irish, few people were aware of this and thought he was British.
3 Although all  other  actors  that  have  played  the character  of  Indiana  Jones have  played  him at  a 
different age and that Indiana Jones is an iconic character played by Harrison Ford, it was felt that 
Harrison Ford has played sufficient other roles to make this piece of semantic information sufficiently 
different to a name.
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on  screen in  Palatino  Font,  size  20,  black  on  white.  Only  morph 
continua  crossing  category  boundaries  (actors  –  politicians)  were 
used (e.g., Harrison Ford to Tony Blair was used, but not Harrison 
Ford to Pierce Brosnan). Thus, four morph continua were used in 
Experiment 2.  
 3.1.3. Design & Procedure
The type of adaptor was manipulated between-subjects, creating a 
five level univariate design. These were: image; name; specific role; 
occupation; and  nationality. There were four test morph continua, 
with  two identities  making up each continuum.  Participants  were 
randomly allocated to tested in one of the continua such that the 
same number of participants were tested on each continuum (N = 2, 
in each of the adaptor conditions). Participants were then randomly 
allocated to be adapted to one end of continuum such that both 
ends were used as the adaptor identity. The order of presentation of 
the  morphs  during  the  baseline  and  the  test  phases  was 
randomised. Each participant saw a morphed continuum made up of 
only two identities and was adapted to one adaptor. The procedure 
was  identical  to  Experiment  1  with  the  different  adaptors  (no 
auditory adaptors).
3.2. Results
The data was treated as it  was in  Experiment  1.  The mean PSE 
changes  pre-  to  post-adaptation  are  presented  in  Figure  4.  This 
shows that for the image and name adaptor, more responses were 
of  the  non-adapted  identity  post-adaptation.  However,  for  the 
semantic information, there is a trend for less specific information to 
cause smaller aftereffects than more specific semantic information. 
These data were subjected to a five-level univariate ANOVA.
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___________________
Figure 4 about here
__________________
The  ANOVA revealed  that  there  was  a  significant  effect  of 
adaptor type on the magnitude of the FIAE, F(4, 35) = 66.770, MSE 
=  7.549,  p <  .001.  Tukey  post  hoc comparisons  were  used  to 
explore this effect further and these revealed that the magnitude of 
adaptation  was  significantly  greater  for  the  image than:  name 
(mean difference = 11.029, p < .001); specific role (mean difference 
= 15.781,  p < .001);  occupation (mean difference = 18.601,  p < .
001);  and  nationality (mean  difference  =  19.327,  p <  .001). 
Aftereffects were significantly greater for name than:  specific role 
(mean difference = 4.752, p < .001); occupation (mean difference = 
7.572,  p  < .001); and  nationality (mean difference = 8.298,  p < .
001).
As in Experiment 1, one-sample t-tests were used to assess 
whether  adaptation  was  observed  for  any  of  the  stimuli.  These 
showed significant adaptation when the adaptor was: the  image, t 
(7) = 44.392, p < .001; the name, t (7) = 5.629, p < .001; and the 
specific role, t (7) = 3.481,  p < .05). Significant PSE changes were 
not observed when the adaptor was the occupation, t (7) = 0.940, p 
> .37, or the nationality, t (7) = 0.069, p > .94.
An additional analysis was run on these data that compared 
the  level  of  specificity  of  the  semantic  information  and  the 
magnitude of the FIAE in a correlation. Data for the image condition 
was  not  included  in  this  analysis.  This  analysis  is  clearly  non-
parametric,  since  the  level  of  specificity  was  rather  arbitrarily 
ranked thus: name was coded as the most specific (given a value of 
1); specific role was coded as the second most specific (rank of 2); 
occupation was given a rank of 3; and nationality was given a rank 
of 4. A Spearman’s Rho test was run on these data and revealed a 
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correlation  between  specificity  of  semantic  information  and  the 
magnitude of the FIAE, r (31) = -.654, p < .001. This correlation was 
negative due to the coding strategy.
3.4. Discussion
These results have indicated that FIAE can be caused by face and 
name stimuli and by specific role information. No aftereffects were 
observed for less specific semantic information. Indeed, there is a 
correlation between the specificity of the semantic information and 
the magnitude of  the FIAE in  which the aftereffect  is  greater  for 
more  specific  semantic  information.  Although  this  was  a  non-
parametric correlation, it was strong, suggesting that the effect of 
specificity  of  semantic  information  has  a  strong  effect  on  the 
magnitude of the FIAE. That is, the greater the level of specificity, 
the stronger the aftereffect. Additionally, this relationship appears 
to be linear. This indicates that the connexions between semantic 
information and visual  information are stronger  for  more  specific 
semantic information than less specific semantic information. These 
results  parallel  those  of  priming  where  category  information  can 
cause  priming  effects,  but  these  are  much  smaller  than  specific 
semantic information and identity priming.
There is one concern with these data and that is that the role 
specific information may actually be identity specific and act like a 
name.  The  present  data  indicate  that  this  is  unlikely  since 
aftereffects caused by the name stimulus were significantly larger 
than  aftereffects  caused  by  the  specific  role  information.  If  they 
were  acting  in  the  same  manner,  one  would  have  predicted  no 
difference in the magnitude of adaptation between these two types 
of  semantic  information.  Of  course,  one cannot  rule  out  that  for 
some participants and some identities, specific role information may 
act as a name. For example, some people are unaware that there 
are other actors who have played Indiana Jones and there are many 
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people who will  never have seen James Bond films without Pierce 
Brosnan  (at  least  at  the  time  of  testing).  Future  research  may 
explore  whether  knowledge  of  a  particular  person  influences  the 
magnitude  of  the  FIAE  in  regards  to  semantic  information.  For 
example, would fans of the classic Doctor Who television show less 
adaptation  to  the  name  stimulus  “The  Doctor”  and  a  morph 
continuum  containing  David  Tennant  (the  present  Doctor)  than 
those who only know the modern Doctor Who.
4. Experiment 3: Associative Adaptation
Experiments 1 and 2 have demonstrated that adaptation to non-
visual  identity  specific  semantic  information  can  cause  FIAEs 
analogous  to  semantic  priming.  Similar  to  semantic  priming  is 
associative priming which is where the presentation of a particular 
individual facilitates processing of someone who is highly associated 
with that person. For example, Bruce (1983) showed that priming 
Eric  Morcambe  would  speed  up  familiarity  judgements  to  Earnie 
Wise  (a  British  comedy  duo  from  the  1970s).  The  present 
experiment thus aimed to use this as an analogy in an adaptation 
experiment.  Participants  were  adapted  to  one  identity  from  an 
associated pair  and aftereffects measured in  a morph continuum 
containing the other identity from the pair and a third identity. If 
associative adaptation occurs, then adaptation to one identity in a 
double act should cause observable aftereffects in the perception of 
the  other  identity  in  the  double  act.  Associative  adaptation  is 
expected to  cause smaller  aftereffects  than perceptual  repetition 
adaptation since it is semantic and thus will be similar in magnitude 
to name adaptation shown in Experiment 2.
This design also allowed for an additional assessment, directly 
comparing  perceptual  repetition  adaptation  with  semantic 
associative  adaptation.  Conditions  were  run in  which  participants 
were  adapted  to  one  identity  from  an  associated  pair  and 
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aftereffects  measured  in  a  morph  continuum  containing  both 
identities in the associated pair. Thus, perceptual adaptation due to 
the specific identity would be in competition with adaptation to the 
associated person. Several outcomes were possible in this scenario: 
the aftereffect could be the result of perceptual adaptation only; the 
aftereffect could be the result of associative adaptation only, thus 
be in the opposite direction to perceptual adaptation; the two forms 
of  adaptation  could  balance  each  other  out  and  result  in  no 
adaptation; or the two forms of adaptation could combine producing 
a  smaller  perceptual  adaptation  effect  (due  to  its  effects  being 
reduced by the opposite effects caused by associative adaptation). 
The  double-acts  chosen  were  well  known  contemporary  comic 
double-acts. Both name and images were used as adaptors.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Participants  were  96  psychology  undergraduate  students  who 
undertook  this  experiment  as  partial  fulfilment  of  a  course 
requirement.  All  participants  had  normal  or  corrected  vision  and 
were Caucasian British nationals who were familiar with the target 
identities.  Participants  were  randomly  divided  into  one  of  the 
conditions  with  the  pre-requisite  that  an  equal  number  of 
participants participated in each condition (N = 16). 
4.1.2. Materials
Face images were collected from the internet of two double acts: 
Anthony McPartlin and Declan Donnelly from British television show 
“Saturday Night  Takeaway”;  and David  Walliams and Matt  Lucas 
from the British television show “Little Britain”. Morph continua were 
created  as  in  Experiment  1  from  the  100%  Identity  1  to  100% 
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Identity  2.  Two  types  of  continua  were  constructed.  The  first 
involved pairing one member of the double act with one member of 
the other double act (e.g., Ant McPartlin with David Walliams). Four 
cross-double act morph continua of this make-up were constructed. 
The second involved morphing between the members of the double 
act (e.g., David Walliams with Matt Lucas). Two within-double act 
morph continua of this make-up were constructed. Thus, six morph 
continua were created in total. The adaptors were the 100% images. 
The name stimuli were displayed on screen in Palatino Font, size 20, 
black on white.
 4.1.3. Design & Procedure
A 2 by 3 design was employed in which the type of adaptor was 
manipulated between-subjects: the first variable was the mode of 
the  adaptor  (name  or  face)  and  the  second  was  the  relation 
between the adaptor and the identities used to construct the morph 
– These were: same person tested in a morphed continuum with a 
non-associated  person  (hereafter  same  person  in  different,  e.g., 
adapted to Matt Lucas, aftereffects measured in the Matt Lucas – 
Declan  Donnelly  morph  continuum);  associated  person (e.g., 
adapted to Matt Lucas, aftereffects measured in David Walliams – 
Declan  Donnelly  morph  continuum);  same  person  tested  in  a 
morphed  continuum with  the  associated  person  (hereafter  same 
person  in  associated,  e.g.,  adapted  to  Matt  Lucas,  aftereffects 
measured in Matt Lucas – David Walliams morph continuum). The 
four  morphed continua  involving  cross-double  act  identities  were 
used as the test stimuli for the first two conditions (same person in 
different  continuum,  and  associated  person).  The  two  morphed 
continua  involving  within-double  act  identities  were  used  for  the 
third  condition  (same  person  in  associated  continuum).  Two 
identities made up each morph. Participants were adapted to one 
identity  used  to  construct  the  morph  continuum  for  the  same 
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person  in  different  continuum and  same  person  in  associated 
continuum,  but were adapted to the associated identity of one of 
the identities used to construct the test morph continuum for the 
associated person condition.  Participants were randomly allocated 
to be tested in one of the continua such that the roughly the same 
number of participants were tested on each continuum (N = 4 in 
each of the adaptor conditions for the cross-double act morphs, or N 
=  8  in  each  of  the  adaptor  conditions  for  the  within-double  act 
morphs). Participants were then randomly allocated to be adapted 
to  one end of  continuum such that  both  ends were used as  the 
adaptor  identity  an  equal  number  of  times.  The  order  of 
presentation of the morphs during the baseline and the test phases 
was randomised. Each participant saw a morphed continuum made 
up  of  only  two  identities  and  was  adapted  to  one  adaptor.  The 
procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with the different adaptors 
(no auditory adaptors) and with different response keys4.
4.2. Results
The data was treated as it  was in  Experiment  1.  The mean PSE 
changes  pre-  to  post-adaptation  are  presented  in  Figure  4.  This 
shows  that  aftereffects  were  observed  for  all  types  of  adaptor, 
though they appear to be greater when the adaptor was an image 
than  a  name.  These  data  were  subjected  to  a  2  x  3  between-
subjects ANOVA with the factors: adaptor modality (face or name); 
and adaptor identity in relation to test continua.
___________________
Figure 5 about here
__________________
4 Response keys were A for Anthony McPartlin, D for Declan Donnerly, L for Matt Lucas, and W for  
David Walliams
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The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of modality, F(1, 
90)  = 173.779,  MSE = 9.636,  p < .001,  where aftereffects  were 
greater  following  adaptation  to  the  face  image  than  the  name 
(mean difference = 8.353).  There was also a significant  effect of 
adaptor identity,  F(2, 90) = 41.655,  MSE = 9.636, p < .001. Tukey 
post hoc comparisons explored this main effect revealing that the 
aftereffect due to the associated person was significantly less than 
the aftereffect due to  same person in different  continuum (mean 
difference  =  6.455,  p <  .001)  and  same  person  in  associated 
continuum (mean  difference  =  5.753,  p  < .001).  The  difference 
between  same person in different and  same person in associated 
was not significant (mean difference = 0.703, p > .63).
These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction 
between modality and adaptor, F(2, 90) = 14.337, MSE = 9.636, p < 
.001. Simple effects show that when image was the modality the 
magnitude of the aftereffect was less for associated person than for 
same image in different continuum (mean difference = 10.342, p < .
001) and for same image associated continuum (mean difference = 
8.969,  p < .001). The difference between  same image in different 
continuum and  same  image  in  associated  continuum was  not 
significant (mean difference = 1.374, p > .49). When the name was 
the modality  of  the adaptor,  there  was no significant  differences 
across the three types of adaptor (largest difference = 2.568, p > .
05), though the pattern of results was the same.
As  in  Experiment  1,  a  series  of  one  sample  t-tests  were 
conducted on these data to see if aftereffects were observed for all 
these  stimuli.  These  revealed  that  significant  aftereffects  were 
observed for: same image in a different continuum, t (15) = 27.389, 
p < .001; associated image, t (15) = 24.801, p < .001; same image 
in associated continuum, t (15) = 13.500, p < .001; same name in a 
different continuum, t (15) = 9.193,  p < .001;  associated name, t 
(15) = 7.299, p < .001; and same name in associated continuum, t 
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(15) = 11.476, p < .001. Thus, all the adaptors produced significant 
aftereffects.
4.3. Discussion
Adaptation to an associated person (be it  the name or the face) 
causes an FIAE. These results indicate that activating one part of a 
double act will also activate the other part of a double act (priming) 
and if  this activation is prolonged then adaptation will  occur. The 
magnitude of  the aftereffect  due to adaptation to the associated 
person is half that of the aftereffect due to adaptation to the same 
person, irrespective of the morph continuum being tested. In the 
condition where participants were adapted to one member of the 
double  act  and  tested  in  the  morph  continuum  containing  both 
members  of  the  double  act,  it  would  seem that  the  adaptations 
might  cancel  each  other  out.  This  is  because  there  would  be 
adaptation to the person presented (e.g., Matt Lucas) and it would 
cause adaptation to the associated person (e.g.,  David Walliams). 
So in the test morph continuum ranging between the two members 
of the double act (Matt Lucas and David Walliams), the adaptation 
to one end (due to the image being presented: e.g.,  Matt  Lucas) 
should  be  balanced  by  adaptation  to  the  other  end  (due  to  the 
associated person: e.g., David Walliams). This does not happen, and 
the  aftereffect  appears  to  be  solely  due  to  the  image  being 
presented. This result is discussed further in the general discussion.
The data from the present study seem to indicate that when 
adaptation is occurring that is at the image or face level and it is in 
competition with adaptation that is occurring at the identity level, 
they do not combine. There is no addition, deletion, or multiplying 
factor  between  these  two  adaptation  processes.  Instead,  the 
perceptual adaptation completely swamps the identity adaptation. 
This  suggests  two distinct  mechanisms are involved in  the FIAEs 
observed here: one perceptual and one identity-based.
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At  this  juncture,  it  becomes  necessary  to  offer  a  possible 
theoretical analysis of what these two distinct mechanisms are in 
the FIAE. One seems to be a simple visual adaptation similar in form 
to  adaptation  to  contrast  or  spatial  frequency,  albeit  to  a  more 
complex shape. This may or may not involve structural information 
about  faces  and  thus  may  or  may  not  be  face-specific.  The 
mechanisms for this may be neuronal fatigue. However, with cross-
modal  adaptation,  one  must  consider  how  the  visual  cortex 
becomes  activated  (if  indeed  it  does)  during  the  processing  of 
identity information. One possible mechanism is that of imagery and 
thus is memory based. Experiment 4 aims to explore imagery as a 
possible mechanism of this cross-modally driven FIAE.
5. Experiment 4
The  previous  experiments  in  this  manuscript  have  demonstrated 
that the FIAE can be caused by adaptation to non-visual information. 
The  present  experiment  explores  two  possible  albeit  related 
mechanisms for cross-modal adaptation. The first mechanism to be 
explored is that of mental imagery. When participants are presented 
with a name, or hear a voice, they may think about that individual. 
Imagination is known to activate the visual cortex for scenes and 
colours  (Ganis,  Thompson,  &  Kosslyn,  2004)  and  also  faces 
(O’Craven  &  Kanwisher,  2001).  Thus,  it  does  seem  distinctly 
plausible that imagination may mediate the cross-modal adaptation 
(Hills et al., 2009). For imagery to cause adaptation face memory is 
required. Given that memory for faces may not be veridical and may 
be  better  represented  by  caricaturisation  (e.g.,  Lee,  Byatt,  & 
Rhodes, 2000; Rhodes et al., 1987; 1997), caricatures may be able 
to  cause adaptation.  From this  assumption,  adaptation  based on 
memory, imagination, and caricatures should thus be greater than 
adaptation based on veridical images. In the previous experiments, 
adaptation  to names was lower  than veridical  images suggesting 
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that the name does not link as strongly to memory for the face. 
Alternatively,  caricaturisation  may  represent  a  super-identity 
(Rhodes,  1996)  which  lies  along  a  particular  identity  trajectory, 
simply further away from the average (Rhodes et al., 1997). Leopold 
et al.’s  (2001)  work has shown that adapting to a face along an 
identity trajectory affects the perception of an average face. Thus, 
assuming that the caricatures are simply further from the average 
face  along  the  same  identity  trajectory  also  suggests  that 
adaptation  to  caricatures  ought  to  cause  aftereffects.  Thus, 
Experiment  4  explores  aftereffects  caused  by  adaptation  to 
imagination and caricatures and compared to aftereffects caused by 
adaptation to the veridical image.
Two types of  caricature present  themselves to  be used for 
such  a  study.  Photographic  caricatures  are  realistic  computer-
generated  images  that  have  been  exaggerated  according  to  a 
mathematical  formula.  Alternatively,  there  are  artist  drawn 
caricatures, drawn by caricature artists. These are not as similar to 
veridical images as photographic caricatures, and may contain the 
artists own ‘filling in.’ There is, however, a great deal of consistency 
in  the  way different  artists  draw caricatures  of  the same person 
(Goldman & Hagen, 1978). Additionally, the caricature advantage is 
greater  for  line-drawn  caricatures  than  photographic  caricatures 
(e.g.,  Rhodes,  1996).  It  could  be  argued  that  photographic 
caricatures would be more similar to veridical images in terms of 
skin reflectance and as similarity  is  a factor  in  the magnitude of 
adaptation  and  priming,  that  photographic  caricatures  would 
produce  larger  effects  than artist  drawn caricatures.  Additionally, 
artist  drawn caricatures  were easier  to obtain.  Thus,  artist-drawn 
caricatures  were  used  in  the  present  experiment.  These  will 
compared to FIAEs caused by veridical face images.
5.1. Method
35
5.1.1. Participants
Participants  were  48  psychology  undergraduate  students  who 
undertook  this  experiment  as  partial  fulfilment  of  a  course 
requirement.  All  participants  had  normal  or  corrected  vision  and 
were Caucasian British nationals who were familiar with the target 
identities.  Participants  were  randomly  divided  into  one  of  the 
conditions  with  the  pre-requisite  that  an  equal  number  of 
participants  participated  in  each condition  (N = 16).  Participants 
were excluded if they scored less than 12 on Marks’ (1973) Visual 
Imagery Questionnaire (VIQ) as this helped ensure the participants 
were able to mentally visualise faces (see, Hills et al., 2009).
5.1.2. Materials
The face identities used in Experiment 3 were used in Experiment 4. 
Caricature  images  of  Anthony  McPartlin,  Declan  Donnelly,  David 
Walliams and Matt Lucas were collected from the Internet (these 
cannot be presented due to copyright) and these were used as the 
adaptors in the caricature condition. The morph continua that paired 
one member of one double act with one member of the other double 
act constructed (cross-double act continua) in Experiment 3 were 
used here. There were four of these continua.
 5.1.3. Design & Procedure
The  three  types  of  adaptor  were  manipulated  between-subjects. 
These were: veridical face image, imagination, and caricatured face 
image. Participants were randomly allocated to be tested in one of 
the continua such that the same number of participants were tested 
on each continuum in each condition (N = 4 in each of the adaptor 
conditions).  As  two  identities  made  up  each  morph,  participants 
were randomly allocated to be adapted to one end of continuum 
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such that both ends were used as the adaptor  identity  an equal 
number of  times (N = 2, in each of  the adaptor conditions).  The 
order of presentation of the morphs during the baseline and the test 
phases was randomised. Each participant saw a morphed continuum 
made up of only two identities and was adapted to one adaptor.
The  procedure  was  similar  to  Experiment  1,  except  for  the 
imagined condition. In this condition, during adaptation, participants 
were verbally given the instructions: 
Mentally visualise [identity] as vividly and as clearly as you 
can for this and all remaining blank screens.
These instructions allowed participants to think about the person in 
any situation that they wanted.  During the test phase,  when the 
adaptor was on screen between each test morph, the screen went 
blank  for  5  seconds  for  the  imagined  condition.  The  participants 
were  reminded  to  visualise  the  identity  during  all  blank  screens 
during  the  first  of  these  intervals.  A  post-test  question  was 
administered asking the participants how vivid their mental images 
were (c.f., Moradi et al., 2005) in the form of  “How vivid was your 
mental  image of  [name]?”.  All  participants  reported  vivid  mental 
images5. All other aspects of the procedure were identical to those 
described in Experiment 1. 
5.2. Results
The data was treated as it  was in  Experiment  1.  The mean PSE 
changes  pre-  to  post-adaptation  are  presented  in  Figure  6.  This 
shows  that  aftereffects  were  observed  for  all  types  of  adaptor, 
though  these  appear  to  be  greater  when  the  adaptor  was  a 
caricature than imagined. These data were subjected to a three –
level univariate ANOVA.
5 We did not explicitly ask whether the participants had visualised the person they were supposed to.  
We assumed that the participants would report an unclear mental image of a particular identity if they  
had visualised the incorrect person.
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___________________
Figure 6 about here
__________________
The ANOVA revealed a significant effect of adaptor, F(2, 45) = 
44.102, MSE = 22.314, p < .001. Tukey post hoc comparisons were 
used to explore this  effect.  These showed that adaptation to the 
caricature  produced  a  larger  aftereffect  than the  veridical  image 
(mean difference = 4.083, p < .05) and imagined adaptation (mean 
difference  =  15.157,  p <  .001).  In  addition  adaptation  to  the 
veridical  image  produced  a  larger  aftereffect  than  imagination 
(mean difference = 11.074, p < .001).
As  in  Experiment  1,  a  series  of  one-sample  t-tests  were 
conducted  on  these  data.  These  revealed  there  was  significant 
adaptation for the veridical image, t (15) = 36.141,  p < .001, the 
caricature, t (15) = 16.068, p < .001, and the imagined adaptation, 
t (15) = 6.322, p < .001. Thus, significant adaptation was observed 
for all adaptors tested here.
5.3. Discussion
Aftereffects  were  observed  following  imagined  adaptation, 
adaptation  to  veridical  and  caricatured  faces.  The  magnitude  of 
aftereffects was greater following adaptation to a caricature than to 
a veridical image. This finding is intriguing since caricatures are not 
veridical images and thus should not cause such strong perceptual 
adaptation. The  results  are  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that 
memory  for  faces  caricaturises  them  (e.g,  Rhodes  et  al.,  1987, 
1997), such that the stored representation is not the veridical image 
(Harvey,  1986).  Thus,  a  caricature  will  activate  the  stored 
representation of a face more strongly than a veridical image (Lee 
et al., 2000). The conclusion is that the FIAE is larger if memory is 
activated along with perception
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These  results  also  indicate  that  imagination  is  sufficient  to 
cause adaptation.  These results  are consistent with the evidence 
that visual imagination activates the visual centres of the brain but 
are inconsistent with the results of Moradi et al. (2005). The reason 
for  this  discrepancy  is  probably  based  on  the  different 
methodologies. In the present study, we used highly familiar faces 
that participants could visualise in a multitude of poses, views, and 
actions.  The  visualisation  is  likely  to  be  more  elaborate  than  a 
visualisation of a facial image that has only been seen in one pose. 
Additionally, we ensured that our participants were actually able to 
visualise by measuring their visualisation abilities using an objective 
measure (the VIQ,  Marks, 1973).  Thus,  the results of  the present 
study are likely to reflect a more realistic effect of mental imagery 
on adaptation than that presented in the Moradi et al. paper.
6. General Discussion
Four studies explored adaptation based on the stimuli  that cause 
priming as a means of generating stimuli that may cause it. FIAEs 
were  observed  following  adaptation  to  faces,  names,  and  voices 
(Experiment  1)  and  to  identity  specific  semantic  information 
(Experiment  2).  FIAEs  were  not  observed  following  adaptation  to 
non-specific  semantic  information,  though  there  was  a  graded 
decline in the magnitude of observed aftereffects depending on the 
specificity of the semantic information. Experiment 3 demonstrated 
that adaptation to highly associated people can also cause FIAEs. 
Experiment  3  also  noted  that  visual  adaptation  from  the  actual 
person  swamped  or  masked  adaptation  that  was  derived 
semantically,  from  the  associated  person.  Experiment  4 
demonstrated that adaptation was possible by imagination and that 
adaptation to caricatures produced aftereffects that were greater 
than adaptation to veridical images. Together these findings extend 
our knowledge of the FIAE in three particularly important ways: the 
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locus  of  adaptation;  the  involvement  of  imagination;  and  the 
competition between the visual and associative adaptation.
The  adaptation  effects  reported  in  the  present  study  are 
similar  in  nature  to  the  priming  studies  discussed  in  the 
introduction. The effect of priming is dependent on the perceptual 
similarity between the prime and the target and is greatest when 
the prime and target are perceptually identical (Johnston and Barry, 
2006).  Similarly,  aftereffects due to adaptation are dependent on 
perceptual  similarity between the adaptor and test (Yamashita et 
al., 2005) and is greatest when the when the adaptor and target are 
identical. Nevertheless, priming and adaptation does occur for when 
the prime/adaptor does not match the test stimulus.
Cross-modal  repetition  priming  is  significantly  smaller  than 
within-modal priming (Ellis et al., 1997) and cross-modal adaptation 
is significantly smaller than within-modal adaptation (Experiment 1). 
In semantic priming, the effectiveness of the prime is dependent on 
the  uniqueness  of  the  semantic  information  (contrast  semantic 
priming of Bruce and Valentine, 1986, with the category priming of 
Carson  and  Burton,  2001).  Experiment  2  demonstrated  a  similar 
effect where unique semantic adaptors produced larger aftereffects 
than less  unique semantic  adaptors.  Here,  however,  we failed  to 
observed category adaptation similar in nature to category priming. 
Experiment 3 in the present studies demonstrated adaptation to an 
associated person could cause an aftereffect and this was similar in 
nature  to  associated  priming.  Taken  together,  these  findings 
suggest that our assertion that there may be parallels in the loci 
within  the  IAC  model  of  priming  with  those  of  adaptation  was 
justified.
In  the  introduction  three  loci  of  adaptation  were  theorised 
within the IAC framework: the visual level,  the FRU, and the PIN. 
Magnitude of priming effects is larger at the former levels as the 
prime activation does not have to spread through many pools. The 
results of the present study have demonstrated adaptation at all of 
40
these levels and that adaptation is greater at the former levels than 
the  latter  levels.  From  this  theoretical  analysis  it  would  seem 
plausible to suggest that the loci of adaptation are similar to the loci 
of  priming,  albeit  the  reverse  outcome.  The  mechanism may be 
different  however.  At  the  visual  level,  adaptation  has  been 
convincingly  explained  within  the  face-space  framework  (e.g., 
Hurlbert,  2001;  Robbins,  McKone,  &  Edwards,  2007).  Currently, 
there are no models of face perception that allow for adaptation to 
occur  at  the  identity  levels.  Both  the IAC and the FOV allow for 
cross-modal priming but do not include an adaptation mechanism. 
Here we shall describe possible mechanisms for this within the IAC.
The  IAC explains  priming  in  terms of  the  activation  of  one 
node  spreading  by  excitatory  links  to  connected  nodes  in  other 
pools.  This  spreading  of  activation  occurs  vertically  (in  that  it 
crosses pools), but not horizontally (within pools) due to inhibitory 
links  between  nodes  in  the  same  pool.  A  global  decay  function 
ensures that the activation returns to a resting level (Burton et al., 
1990).  The  spread  of  activation  lowers  the  threshold  of  the 
connected  nodes.  However,  with  a  large  number  of  nodes  the 
spread of activation passes through, the effect is smaller. That is, for 
nodes  further  from  the  initially  active  note,  the  threshold  for 
activation  is  not  reduced  by  as  much  as  for  nodes  close  to  the 
initially  active  node.  Thus,  priming  within  the  IAC  is  limited. 
Adaptation produces similar effects, except the threshold for future 
activation is raised rather than lowered, making it harder to activate 
a particular node.
Prolonged activation of a particular node causes that node to 
become active and through spreading activation, nodes connected 
to  it  also  become  activated.  Thus,  these  nodes  become  over-
activated. Adaptation may be such that after prolonged activation of 
a node, its threshold for activation is raised sufficiently to make it 
harder  to  activate  for  a  short  while  after.  That  is,  the  nodes 
subsequently  become  under-activated  or  fatigued.  Thus,  those 
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nodes connected to the adapted node will also become adapted due 
to the spreading activation. This is limited by the same principles as 
the limitation of priming: the spread of activation is limited by the 
number of nodes connected, such that the activation is greatest for 
nodes connected by one link than by many links.
This  explanation  of  adaptation  within  the  IAC  has  one 
limitation: the global decay function ensures that activation level of 
the model is reduced to the resting level. The IAC does not contain 
an element that can raise the activation level of all the nodes to the 
resting level. Thus, a modification to the global decay function which 
would cause activation within the model to be brought back to the 
resting  level  from  either  under-activation  or  over-activation  is 
required.  Future  computational  work  could  address  this 
interpretation and assess this possibility.
The data from Experiment 4 suggesting that imagination can 
cause  adaptation  suggests  one  plausible  mechanism  for  how 
adaptation can spread. Within the IAC, presenting a name (an NRU) 
activates the PIN and this activates the FRU. Imagination may work 
in  a similar  vein.  When participants are asked to think about  an 
individual,  this  causes  activation  in  the  PIN  and  thus  the  FRU. 
Prolonged imagination may thus cause adaptation and will be of a 
similar magnitude to adaptation to a name given that the activation 
has  to  spread through  the  same number  of  nodes.  Alternatively, 
imagination may work directly on the FRUs. However, because it is 
based upon a non-veridical image from memory it may have less 
effect on the FRU. The imagination, for example, could be the face 
in a different, specific, and/or experienced context (such as a film). 
The imagined face is unlikely to be still  and thus may potentially 
cause less activation of the FRU. To establish whether the type of 
visualisation has an effect, it may be possible to instruct participants 
to  visualise  the  faces  in  different  situations  and  analyse  the 
magnitude of any observed aftereffects.
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One of the most important findings related to the loci of the 
adaptation  effects  is  that  visual  adaptation  was  pitted  against 
semantic adaptation in Experiment 3. Here, adaptation to Identity A 
should cause an aftereffect in the perception of Identity A. However, 
since  Identity  A  was  so  closely  associated  with  Identity  B,  that 
adaptation to Identity A causes an aftereffect in Identity B. Thus, in 
the  morph  continuum  made  up  of  Identity  A  and  Identity  B, 
adaptation  to  Identity  A  should  cause  aftereffects  observable  in 
Identity A (adaptation to the FRU) and ‘the opposite’ identity in the 
continuum,  Identity  B  (adaptation  to  the  PIN).  Figure  7  shows  a 
demonstration of this using Ant and Dec. Adaptation to Ant causes a 
visual (FRU) adaptation to Ant and will shift the perceived midpoint 
in  the  morph  toward  Ant.  It  also  causes  associative  (in  the  PIN) 
adaptation to Dec and will shift the perceived midpoint in the morph 
toward Dec. In Experiment 3, we demonstrated that FRU adaptation 
completely  swamps the alternative PIN adaptation,  such that  the 
overall adaptation is as if the PIN adaptation does not occur. This 
suggests  that  the  FRU  adaptation  completely  overrides  the  PIN 
adaptation  and  this  may  be expected  for  two reasons  described 
below.
___________________
Figure 7 about here
__________________
If imagery is the mechanism behind adaptation at the identity 
level, one must acknowledge that activation of the visual cortex due 
to imagery is  smaller  than activation  of  the visual  cortex  due to 
actual perception (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 1994). Thus, the adaptation 
due to imagery will not be as strong as adaptation due to the actual 
perception.  Nevertheless,  this  would  suggest  that  the  aftereffect 
due  to  perceptual  adaptation  would  be  smaller  if  there  was 
‘opposite’  PIN  adaptation  occurring.  This  was  not  observed.  The 
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implication is that the perceptual adaptation is based on different 
mechanisms from the semantic adaptation and when they are in 
opposition  the  perceptual  adaptation  takes  priority.  Jiang  et  al. 
(2006) have suggested that aspects of visual adaptation are unlikely 
to  be  face-specific.  Specifically,  any  stimulus  that  preserves  the 
underlying  “conglomeration  of  shape-  and  reflectance-based 
features and their configuration” of faces, but not valid faces should 
be effective in adapting facial  identity (p. 495).  That is,  low-level 
neural channels (such as shape and reflectance) combine in such a 
way  to  cause  adaptation.  These  non-face  specific  systems  may 
override the person identity based adaptation. One explanation for 
this would be that processing of one identity so completely prevents 
another identity from being activated as fully. Visual presentation of 
a  face  is  thus  hypothesised  to  create  more  activation  than 
association.  These  rather  hypothetical  suggestions  require  future 
work and greater elaboration before firm conclusions can be drawn.
The final  important  finding is that adaptation to caricatures 
produced greater aftereffects than adaptation to veridical images. 
An explanation for this may be based upon the same explanation for 
the caricature advantage in  face recognition  (e.g.,  Rhodes et al., 
1987). That is memory for faces is not veridical. It may exaggerate 
the most distinguishing features (e.g.,  Harvey, 1986).  Caricatures 
may thus be a more veridical image of the representation of a face 
stored in memory. This is  especially true for computer generated 
caricatures  (i.e.,  realistic  photographs  stretched  by  a  computer 
programme potentially  involving morphing).  From this  analysis,  it 
would suggest that adaptation involving some memory component 
(a  stored  FRU)  causes  greater  aftereffects  than  those  based  on 
visual characteristics only. In this way, adaptation of the perceptual 
front-end of the IAC and the FRU pool  causes greater adaptation 
than perceptual adaptation alone. This idea is partially in contrast 
with the suggestion given above for associative adaptation in which 
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the semantically based adaptation does not add or interfere with 
visual based adaptation.
Since the present study used artist drawn caricatures rather 
than computer generated ones, an alternative suggestion may be 
drawn. Caricatures exaggerated features that are often talked about 
and joked about (for example, Prince Charles has big ears). These 
exaggerated  features  may become semantic  information  in  their 
own right.  Thus,  it  may be that caricatures also contain identity-
specific semantic information that can add to the visual adaptation 
effects. In this way, there is a visually coded and a semantic coded 
adaptation  occurring  (using  the  terminology  of  Bruce,  1982,  and 
Bruce & Young, 1986). These two types of adaptation add together 
to form a greater adaptation effect. Nevertheless, this explanation 
still suggests that visual based adaptation does add to other forms 
of adaptation.
From the explanations provided thus far, it seems as if there 
are  multiple  mechanisms  in  the  FIAE  reported  here.  Visual 
adaptation  occurs  when  the  adaptor  and  the  test  stimuli  are 
identical and may not be face specific (Jiang et al., 2007). Identity 
adaptation  occurs  through  the  person  recognition  system and  is 
significantly  weaker  than  perceptual  adaptation.  Caricatures  may 
cause larger aftereffects than veridical  images due to adaptation 
involving  perception  and  memory  combined.  However,  the 
associative  adaptation  discussed  earlier  seems  to  suggest  that 
visual adaptation is stronger than semantic or identity adaptation. In 
this  way, these two types of  adaptation  do not  add together (or 
more  accurately,  the  semantic  adaptation  does  not  remove  any 
visual  adaptation  if  they  are  in  the  opposite  direction).  Thus,  it 
seems as if the aftereffects are based on visual adaptation primarily 
and only include identity adaptation if it is consistent with the visual 
adaptation, otherwise the face recognition system ignores it.
The  cross-modal  adaptation  reported  here  indicates  that 
identities  can  be  selectively  adapted  within  the  brain.  This  is 
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consistent  with  evidence  suggesting  the  fusiform  gyrus  is  a 
multimodal  processing  region  (Kung,  2007).  Aftereffects  are 
observed in the perception of faces, where the recognition of a face 
is more difficult following prolonged stimulation of identity-specific 
information  that  is  visual,  auditory,  or  semantic.  This  research 
advances our knowledge of adaptation effects in face processing by 
demonstrating  that  they  can  be  caused  by  non-visual  identity 
information.  Prior  research  on  adaptation  indicated  face  identity 
aftereffects.  The current study furthers this by reporting  identity-
specific  aftereffects  (regardless  of  mode  of  presentation),  which 
may  implicate  adaptation  to  specific  neuronal  populations 
representing a particular identity.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1. A schematic representation of the IAC based upon Burton 
and Bruce (1993). The perceptual front-end of the IAC links to the 
FRUs,  VRUs  and  Word  Recognition  Units,  which  link  to  the  PINs 
(through the NRUs for WRUs). The PINs are also connected to the 
NRUs and the SIUs. All the links shown are bi-directional.
Figure 2. The procedure for the adaptation paradigm employed in 
Experiments 1 to 4, with the same image as adaptor as that used to 
construct the test morphs.
Figure 3 Mean percentage shift toward the adaptor post adaptation 
for the four types of adaptor in Experiment 1 (repetition adaptation). 
Error  bars  represent  standard  error.  Zero  is  indicative  of  no 
adaptation.
Figure 4. Mean percentage shift toward the adaptor post adaptation 
for the five types of adaptor in Experiment 2 (semantic adaptation). 
Error  bars  represent  standard  error.  Zero  is  indicative  of  no 
adaptation.
Figure 5. Mean percentage shift toward the adaptor post adaptation 
for  the  five  types  of  adaptor  in  Experiment  3  (associative 
adaptation). Error bars represent standard error. Zero is indicative 
of no adaptation.
Figure 6. Mean percentage shift toward the adaptor post adaptation 
for  the  five  types  of  adaptor  in  Experiment  4  (non-veridical 
adaptation). Error bars represent standard error. Zero is indicative 
of no adaptation.
Figure 7. Morph continua from Identity A (Ant) to Identity B (Dec) in 
increments of 25% Dec. Arrow X shows the direction of the change 
in  perceived  midpoint  due  to  visual  adaptation  to  Ant.  Arrow  Y 
shows the change in perceived midpoint due to identity adaptation 
to Ant.
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